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Article 9

Ethical Theory for Catholic Professionals
James F. Drane, Ph.D.

The author, a fa culty member at Edinboro University of Pennsylvania,
describes the followin g as an "attempt to write about ethical theory for
practicing physicians. "

Introduction: The Confusing Ethical Landscape
Physicians today must be conversant with medical ethics , but few have
time to delve into the philosophical assumptions operating behind many of
the positions taken by ethicists on clinical questions . Controversy about right
and wrong in medical practice may result from different ways of interpreting
the same data , but many times it follows from widely different underlying
assumptions about what makes any act right or wrong. Practicing physicians
cannot be expected to be experts on philosophical assumptions in forming
ethical evaluations (metaethics). It is a big enough job just to learn enough
about rules and principles to make defensible treatment decisions . But since
background theories do appear in one form or another whenever doctors
read about concrete problems , it may be well to provide a quick overview
of ethical theory for the busy practitioner.
About 50 years ago , moral philosophers began to make sense out of a
confusing ethical landscape by distinguishing between two general styles
of moral theorizing , called deontological and teleologic~l. Since that time
most ethicists frame their discussions in terms of these categories, providing
thereby some common linguistic and conceptual categories. Intuitionists ,
emotivists , language analysts , existentialists, and natural law theorists differ
in their approach to right and wrong but are all able to find a place in or
around these two general conceptual categories .

Basic Metaethical Categories
Deontological theories (from the Greek dean , duty) , include all those
thought systems which hold that it is possible to say that an act is always
right or wrong , no matter what the consequences. According to deontologists ,
some acts are intrinsically right and obligatory, others are intrinsically wrong
and forbidden . Right acts have intrinsic right-making characteristics , and
wrong acts are .evil for the opposite reason , Deontologists agree that right
and wrong are not determined by the good or bad results which the acts
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produce. They are critical of theories which relativize even basic moral norms
on the basis of beneficial outcome.
Teleological theorists (from telos , goal) hold that rightness or wrongness
is determined by an act 's tendency to produce good or bad consequences.
Generally the teleologists (also called consequentialists) are more liberal
and relativistic thinkers. They insist on close attention to the special
circumstance of each act and on a quantification of the good and bad results
which the act produces before making a judgment about its morality. Moral
agents in these theories are held accountable for the results flowing from
their choice.

Function of Metaethical Categories
The categories of deontology and teleology are umbrella-like. Under them
are included different type theories and different style thinkers. The terms
refer to traditions and orientations more than to a specific theory or system .
Deontological theories , for example , focus on duty, right and wrong, moral
norms and imperatives. Teleological theories, on the other hand , talk more
about goods, results, satisfactions, and common welfare. Comprehensive
ethical systems like Natural Law have a place for all the above elements.
The choice of a theoretical model usually reflects a preference for its
orientation and focus rather than a conviction that others can or should be
left out of consideration .
Although the terms deontological and teleological are meant to clarify
ethical discourse at the most attractive level , a medical professional who
decides to read in ethics may be confused by the way these terms are used
by different authors. Accordingly, as writers prefer one or the other
ori~ntation themselves , the opposite stance often is defined in a narrow,
less adequate, and instinctively less attractive way. One tends then to get
different definitions of deontological and teleological and very different
estimates of the logical extension of these terms. And yet this much can
always be said reliably : consequentialists stress beneficen'ce or doing good
for others as the essence of moral obligations. Deontologists, on the other
hand , stress duty, obligation, and law. Deontologists try to make a case
for duty for its own sake, or because an act is considered binding on all
rational beings. For teleologists, however, goodness depends upon an
evaluation of circumstances and consequences made in light of a particular
society'S values . What each orientation stresses is a legitimate element in
ethical evaluation, but something is lacking in each which would make its
particular focus convincing to the other side.

The Need for Some Unity in Ethics
Ethical thinking and discourse were not always so fragmented and
confusing, because religion , rather than philosophy , once provided common
background suppositions. Historically there was broad agreement about
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which acts were right or wrong, based on a common understanding of God's
will. God's will, as revealed in Scripture, served as the basis for determining
the morality of acts throughout Judeo-Christian history. Now , however,
after secularization, any ethical agreement based on our religious heritage
is gone. To make things worse, an adequate secular substitute for the function
once filled by a religiously-based ethics has not yet been found. The
deontological/teleological controversy and all the modern confusion about
ethics are reflections of a theological gap which philosophies struggle to fill.

Human Existence as a Unifying Concept
What is needed in order to create some approximation of agreement about
morality is a convincing theory of human existence on which all the elements
of ethics (duties, obligations, and norms, as well as results, satisfactions
and welfare) can be grounded, and in light of which the basic values peculiar
to medicine can be given a place within a general system for making ethical
judgments . Such a theory would provide us with an account of what it is
to be a person and also what it means to be ill. Based on this account, certain
acts could be seen as promoting human flourishing, and others as diminishing
or violating the human. In light of such an understanding, specific acts could
convincingly be presented as intrinsically right or wrong, and norms based
on this understanding could be considered absolute. Even the consequences
of acts would be judged more consistently as good or bad in light of an
established standard of human flourishing.

The Alternative to a Convincing Theory of the Human Person
In the absence of a convincing philosophical anthropology, the
deontology/teleology controversy centers on the question of whether there
are absolute moral norms or whether every norm admits of exceptions . Are
there right acts which in certain circumstances are wrong because of bad
consequences, or evil acts which are moral because f resulting good
consequences? Deontologists insist that there are norms which specify actions
as good or bad, independent or dependent circumstances. Killing the innocent
is an example of such a norm. Teleologists hold that in extreme conflict
situations, following even this norm may not be required.
Deontologists insist that certain acts are intrinsically wrong, and we need
not be preoccupied with consequences before deciding on their immorality:
perjury, for example; murder; or doing a patient harm without compensating
benefit. For the teleologists, these acts are wrong not because the act itself
is value negative, but because negative circumstances and disproportioned
consequences are built into the term. All other things being equal, the acts
of lying and killing and harming are negative and should be avoided ; but
still, special circumstances and consequences have to be taken into
consideration.
If lying hurts other people unjustly , it can be called perjury and absolutely
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proscribed; killing another unjustly becomes murder and is forbidden for
the same reason. But lying and killing as physical acts would not be wrong
absolutely for the teleologist. Only negative physical acts joined to
disproportionate reasons (considerations of circumstances and consequences)
constitute moral evils which are always forbidden. In medical practice the
harming of a patient ordinarily would be wrong because of bad consequences,
but there may be situations in which violation of patients would produce
more good than bad results and therefore would be ethically justified.
What can be made of the differences between deontologists and
teleologists? Is there any way of overcoming them or coming to an agreement
on certain basic points? I think so. Deontologists are right in their insistence
on moral absolutes and intrinsically evil acts. Norms like "never take an
innocent life , " " never act unjustly ," " never act unreasonably ," " never
violate a helpless patient " are , in fact , absolute . No exceptions are
admissible, either because considerations of circumstances and consequences
are built into the terms " innocent life ," " unjust, " " unreasonably ,"
" violate," or because no circumstances can be imagined which would make
these acts right. Moral terms like murder , perjury , pedophilia , mean that
the act described lacks a proportionate reason .
Norms are important because they shape our behavior and influence the
inner structure of the ethical person. By doing away with norms , we would
impoverish ourselves ethically. But abstract norms do not solve particular
moral problems. Is the procedure I am about to perform on my patient just,
honest, reasonable, respectful of life? The principles " respect life," or " give
to every person his due," " do no harm ," are important but do not tell me
what specifically to do. Here the teleologist is right in insisting on
considerations of circumstances and consequences , which always playa role
in making concrete moral determinations. But given the way we are as human
beings , certain acts consistently produce bad consequences, which always
playa role in making concrete moral determinations. But given the way
we are as human beings , certain acts consistently produce bad consequences
so that they can be said to be intrinsically evil.

Mediating the Deontology/Teleology Debate
The key to mediating between the deontological and teleological
orientations - and, indeed , the key to overcoming the moral fragmentations
characteristic of contemporary culture - is a convincing understanding of
what we are like as human beings. From agreement on what we are like ,
it is a short step to agreeing on how we should act. An act is right because
it promotes the human , and it is wrong because it distorts or diminishes
a human person. In medical terms , an act is right when it benefits the patient
and wrong when it harms or makes the patient' s condition worse. Consistent
and defensible ethical choices presuppose an order of goods which , in the
absence of revelation from God, can only be rooted in an understanding
of the structure of the person and the relationship between doctor and patient.
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Such an understanding would provide the standards and limits for human
actions, because it would constitute the basis for making judgments about
the presence or absence of proportionate reasons for acting .
Deontologists worry, and rightly so , that purely teleological systems
sacrifice basic values when good results for the majority are foreseen . A
comprehensive or integral understanding of human being (including social
dimensions like family, race , species), however , would furnish absolute
standards and proscribe certain acts , even if a particular majority realize
a short-term benefit. Norms rooted in human beings can be both specific
and exceptionless because they do no( depend upon cultural or c1assbound
assessments of results . Then, circumstances and consequences of acts may
be taken into account without worry that these considerations will erode
moral norms. In effect, the best of both the deontological and teleological
orientations can be integrated and preserved. The key is a convincing account
of what it means to be human.
Where , however, can such an account of human existence and personhood
be found? Where is there a theory of human being which is comprehensive
enough to synthesize the major insights of Western thought with the
traditional values of Western medicine and yet provide room enough tq grow
and develop in light of emerging research and learning? The benefits of
this type of moral theory are obvious: it would provide a ground or foundation
for morality , adherence to the basic moral norms and rules, an ultimate
source of appeal in cases of conflict between moral principles and rules,
and a basis on which to evaluate consequences of acts. Once a convincing
account of personhood is articulated, working toward its flourishing and
proscribing maleficient behaviors would both be more effective. Such an
account would unify our rationale for being moral.

Conclusion: Contributions from Medicine, Philosophy and Religion
Western medicine, both organic and psychiatric, can h~lp in this project
because doctors know a great deal about what is good for human life . Western
philosophy, in its many traditions and styles, holds certain characteristics
to be peculiarly human and it, too, will playa role. The Judeo-Christian
tradition provides unwaivering testimony in support of conditions which
are the prerequisites for human dignity. Finally, the idea that the structure
of the human person provides the foundation of morality happens to be our
Catholic tradition at its best. St. Thomas's moral philosophy was based upon
this idea and Vatican II continued to insist upon the same notion. "The
moral aspects of any procedure . . . must be determined by objective
standards which are based on the nature of the person and the person ' s acts"
(The Church in the Modern World, n. 51). The commentary on this statement
explained that the nature of the person is a general principle which applies
to all human actions and that in applying this criterion, no single dimension
of the person can be omitted, isolated or highlighted to the detriment of
all the rest. The person must be integrally and adequately considered .
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Morality may seem to some to have disintegrated into a morass of
relativism and emotivism but physicians generally recognize the need of
more solid objective standards for doing medical ethics. On the horizon ,
there are reasons for hope. We know at least where the foundation for such
an ethics lies. And the empirical information needed to build upon that
foundation is at hand. We know generally what is humanizing and what
dehumanizes . There will never be a time when all or even most people will
agree about matters of ethics, but as Catholic professionals, we already have
a system of ethics which does not ignore the wisdom of the past and provides
room to integrate the wisdom emerging from contemporary scholarship.
The challenge is to build wisely on our solid foundation.
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